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French-Egyptian Relations before 
the Suez Crisis (1954-1956)
Sofia Papastamkou
University Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne
In 1954, a shift in France’s relations with Egypt, where it held mainly consi-
derable economic and cultural positions, 1 began to be designed, as the 
government of Pierre Mendès France was about to lay the foundations 
of a readjustment of the country’s policy for the Middle East. After the 
Second World War France was no longer a Middle East power. But from 
1950 on it could appear as one, at least in relative terms, thanks to its as-
sociation with its American and British allies in the tripartite declaration 
of 1950 and in the projects of organization of collective defence in the 
region being put forward by the British (Middle East Committee/Middle 
East Defence Organization). By 1954 these projects had already been 
shelved, because of Egyptian opposition and lack of essential American 
support. 2 American policy on Middle East defence, as put forward by the 
Eisenhower administration, was one of favouring bilateral regional pacts 
between the countries of the Northern Tier area—Turkey, Iraq, Iran and 
Pakistan—without direct participation of the Western powers. Contrary 
1 French economic interests in Egypt included French funds and technical assistance, activity 
of French banks, insurance companies (three fifths of the corresponding market) and various 
enterprises (cotton and tissue markets, industry), as well as extended commercial exchanges, 
France being the first buyer of Egyptian cotton in 1953. The French also hoped to participate in 
the various agricultural and industrial projects that the Egyptian government was planning to 
initiate. As far as French cultural interests are concerned, these mainly included French schools 
(58,659 pupils in 1954), the Institut français d’archéologie orientale, French staff in Egyptian 
schools, and hospitals. See Ministère des Affaires étrangères [hereafter: MAE], Levant 1953-
1959, Égypte 484, s/direction du Levant, note pour le service du Protocole, 1er avril 1954; 848 AL, 
Gillet à P. Mendès France: Mission bancaire française 5-9 juin a/s du haut-barrage d’Assouan, 
25  juin 1954; Levant  1953-1959, Égypte  505, note de M.  André Thoreau, délégué supérieur 
des Français de l’étranger (Égypte, Soudan, Libye, Arabie Saoudite et Éthiopie). 9,000 French 
were living mainly in Cairo, Alexandria and Heliopolis, see A. Ntalachanis, Les Grecs d’Égypte et 
la crise de Suez : une étape décisive vers l’exode, mémoire de DEA dirigé par Georges B. Dertilis, 
EHESS, 2004, p. 84. France’s interests included equally these of the French shareholders who 
had part in the Suez Canal Company, see Hubert Bonin, Suez, du canal à la finance (1858-1987), 
Paris, Economica, 1987.
2 David R. Devereux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy in the Middle East, 1948-1956 
(London, Macmillan, 1990).
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to the United States and Great Britain, this new concept left France no 
place for an indirect participation in defence arrangements, since her—
very much declining—military influence on Syria was not sufficient a 
position and, moreover, France was not associated in Anglo-American 
talks concerning Middle East defence. Thus France saw its needing to 
reinforce its position.
In the summer of 1954, the newly formed Mendès France govern-
ment thought that this was possible by leaning on Israel and on Egypt. 
Israel was worried about the American policy, fearing extensive rearma-
ment by Arab states. Egypt, for its part, was showing signs of good will to 
approach France, as negotiations with Great Britain about the Suez base 
were drawing to an end, and the French estimated that the Egyptian over-
tures could be encouraged by arms sales and credit cessions. 3 However, 
Egyptian encouragement of North African nationalism and active radio 
propaganda to this purpose through Radio Cairo’s transmission of The 
Voice of the Arabs were not welcomed by France and were likely ins-
tead to poison relations between the two countries. The Algerian revolt 
broke out on 1 November and negotiations about autonomy were going 
on in the protectorates. In December, with a message from Nasser to 
Mendès France and with an aide-mémoire, the Egyptians tried mainly to 
obtain some kind of participation in French-Moroccan negotiations. The 
French were neither likely to accept an Egyptian intrusion into North Afri-
can affairs, nor to permit development of an official Egyptian presence 
through consulates or cultural institutes, as proposed. Mendès France 
refused the Egyptian demands on their entirety. 4
In spite of that, Mendès France was a realist. He favoured a ge-
neral approach where possible towards Egypt and restrained the tough 
tendency represented by the ministry of Defence. The military establish-
ment sought a general embargo on arms sales to the Near East countries, 
especially to Egypt, because of its anti-French propaganda on North Afri-
can questions. Mendès France clearly defined his policy at the beginning 
of 1955, just before the fall of his government and immediately after the 
announcement of the imminent conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi Treaty 
3 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Israël  50, note de dossier sur le réajustement de la politique 
française au Moyen-Orient après la visite du général Dayan, confidentiel, 11 août 1954.
4 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, 827 AL, le ministre des Affaires étrangères au chargé 
d’affaires a.i. au Caire, a/s mémorandum remis par l’ambassadeur d’Égypte, 11 décembre 1954; 
ibid., Égypte 484, ambassade de la République d’Égypte à Paris, aide-mémoire, 16 décembre 
1954; Présidence du Conseil, le président, note pour M. Parodi, 17 décembre 1954.
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in mid-January. Arms sales to all Middle East countries offered a major 
political interest for France. This was, first, because of the importance of 
maintaining good relations with military circles in countries such as Egypt 
and Syria, where their significance in decision-making was decisive, and 
second, because this could mark France’s importance of collaboration in 
the organization of Middle East defence. In particular for Egypt, France 
should try and seize every possibility to participate in the armament and 
instruction of its army, at a moment when the Americans and the British 
maintained a keen interest in these same domains. 5
The Turco-Iraqi Treaty, prelude to the Baghdad Pact, offered com-
mon ground of a precise kind for an approach between France and Egypt, 
since neither country desired it. For France, there were two main reasons 
to oppose it. First, the treaty was giving concrete form to a certain policy 
of its allies in which Paris had no part. Second, France was reserved as 
to any Iraqi initiative, as this country was seen as a threat over Syria, be-
cause of its unionist plans for a Fertile Crescent scheme. 6 Egypt’s grounds 
for opposition had to do with the fact that the Turco-Iraqi Treaty left it in 
a secondary position in relation to Middle East defence plans. This was 
therefore a threat to the Egyptian hegemonic policy in the Arab world, 
and to the international kudos it was seeking by aligning the other Arab 
countries with its policy.
By the end of 1954, Egypt had excluded its participation in a Nor-
thern Tier pact by turning down the American offer of military aid, to 
which strings were attached concerning an Arab-Israeli arrangement 
and participation in a Northern Tier pact. Egypt had made clear to the 
British that its priority was Israel and probably a settlement. In both 
cases, however, Arab-Israeli arrangements and defence organization, the 
underlying objective of the Egyptian regime was clearly to retain Egypt’s 
leadership of the Arab countries and assure itself the lion’s share of 
Western aid. In late December, Egypt seemed to have imposed its views 
on the other Arab countries, after the voting of a resolution in the Arab 
League. This vote made the Arab pact the base for arrangements in Arab 
5 SHAT, 9 Q 5 9/3, s/direction du Levant 64  CM, le ministre des Affaires étrangères 
[hereafter: ministre AE] au ministre de la Défense nationale [hereafter: ministre DN], a/s 
exportation d’armes aux États du Proche-Orient, 19  janvier 1955; MAE, Levant  1953-1959, 
Généralités 545, état-major des forces armées [hereafter: EMFA], 2e division, rapports de la 
France et des pays du Moyen-Orient, très secret, 17 avril 1956, annexe 1, tableau chronologique 
des principales fournitures d’armes françaises aux pays du Moyen-Orient.
6 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 542, télégrammes 202/11 de la s/direction du Levant 
(signés Massigli) à ambassade de France à Ankara, réservé/extrême urgence, 25 janvier 1955.
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countries’ foreign policy and, hence, the base for a defence organization 
in the Middle East. 7
The Turco-Iraqi Treaty was now upsetting Egyptian policy. Fearing 
isolation, Egypt tried instead to isolate Iraq. This failed. In fact, the Cairo 
Conference (22 January-3 February), held between members of the Arab 
pact, did not condemn Iraqi policy. Inter-Arab competition accentuated 
instead over the “countries of the middle”—Syria, Lebanon and Jordan—
and their future orientation. Turkey and Iraq promoted enlargement of 
their axis, whereas Egypt, two days after the signing of the Turco-Iraqi 
Treaty (24 February 1955), denounced the Arab pact and declared that it 
intended to create a unified Egypto-Syrian command as a basis for a new 
Arab pact. 8 In the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of the Turco-
Iraqi Treaty, the two objectives of Egyptian policy would be, first, the 
blocking of further Arab adhesions to the treaty and, second, an Egyp-
tian military reinforcement. The former objective coincided with French 
views, because of the fear that Iraq would find this a means to absorb 
Syria. 9 The latter opened the door to a development of Franco-Egyptian 
military relations.
While the Egyptians were also discussing the possibility of obtai-
ning heavy weapons in exchange for cotton with the Czech commercial 
delegation that arrived in Cairo on 10 February, 10 the French Embassy 
reported an Egyptian request to send twenty to thirty Egyptian air 
force officers to be instructed in France. 11 This was quite an important 
7 On these aspects of Egyptian policy see Peter  L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain 
and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, University of 
North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 184-6; Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: 
The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden, Brill, 1995), p.  97-9; William J.  Burns, Economic 
Aid and American Policy towards Egypt, 1955-1981 (Albany, State University of New York Press, 
1984), p. 23; R. Stephen Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled 
Age (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001), p. 93; Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser 
and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952-1967 (London/Portland, Frank Cass, 2003), 
p. 41.
8 E. Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony …, op. cit., p. 112-15, 126. See also Nasser M. Kalawoun, 
The Struggle for Lebanon: A Modern History of Lebanese-Egyptian Relations (London/New York, 
I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 10-14.
9 See note 6.
10 Rami Ginat, “Origins of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal: A Reappraisal”, in David Tal (ed.), 
The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East (London/Portland, Frank Cass, 2001), 
p. 155 and 159.
11 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, 178 AL, Gillet à Edgar Faure, a/s stagiaires égyptiens 
dans l’armée française, 11 février 1955.
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overture, given the attenuated relations between the two countries in 
this crucial domain. 12
Nasser knew the USSR was ready in principle, since July 1954, to 
discuss an arms deal with Egypt. 13 But what is equally important is that he 
continued to view the fulfilment of his needs for weapons by a Western 
power either as an alternative, or as a means to obtain a keener Ameri-
can interest. The Egyptian request was quickly accepted clearly on the 
grounds that the existing situation was offering France a chance to take 
advantage of Egyptian disillusionment with American and British policy, 
and improve French-Egyptian relations by a positive gesture of this sort. 14
The Gaza raid of 28  February 1955 sealed Egyptian efforts of 
rearmament undertaken after the Turco-Iraqi Treaty by giving them an 
urgent character. Immediately after the raid, the Egyptian chiefs of staff 
asked the French urgently for 30 AMX tanks on condition that they could 
be delivered within a month. 15 An Egyptian mission came to France in 
mid-March to visit military establishments and examine several projects 
about AMX tanks, artillery material, aviation (mainly concerning the 
12 One also has to keep in mind that in the summer of 1954 Mendès  France justified the 
decision to sell Israel modern jet aircraft (Mystère II) by the need to mark France’s presence 
in the Near East and to guarantee its being taken into account in the efforts of its allies for the 
organization of the defence of this region. In this context, the French had been particularly 
annoyed at losing the Syrian air forces market, where Great Britain was selling its Gloster 
Meteor jet aircraft since 1952. The French were keen on making the British adhere strictly to 
the non-substitution agreement of 1945 and their sales to Israel also aimed at compensating 
the British sales made to Syria. The decision to sell modern jet aircraft was particularly 
annoying to London, as the Mystère II was more advanced than the Gloster Meteor. As such, 
the French decision presented the risk not only to start an arms race between the Near East 
states, but also to create the need to reequip the British air forces stationed in the area. In 
their turn, the Egyptians had also shown interest in obtaining the Mystères  II. See note  3; 
National Archives [hereafter: PRO], Foreign Office [hereafter: FO]  371/110813, V1192/326, 
536, Paris to FO, 7 August 1954; PRO, FO 371/115818, VR 10317/1, Tel Aviv to FO, 22 February 
1955; MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 543, 262, s/direction du Levant, le ministre AE au 
ministre DN (signé Fernand-Laurent), a/s exportation d’avions à réaction au Moyen-Orient, 
13 août 1954; PRO, FO 371/110813, V1192/344, 4173, FO to Washington, secret, 19 August 1954; 
PRO, FO  371/110813, V1192/382, Paris to FO, secret, 10  August 1954; PRO, FO  371/110813, 
V1192/832A, Paris to FO, secret, 11 August 1954.
13 Guy Laron, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 
Czechoslovak Arms Deal (Washington, D.C., CWIHP, Working Paper 55, 2007), p. 21
14 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, 49/CAB/AIR/I/SC, le ministre DN au ministre AE, 
5 mars 1955; 432, le ministre AE au ministre DN, 15 mars 1955.
15 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 543, SOFMA, note sur la vente de chars à l’Égypte, 
la Syrie et Israël, 10 mars 1955. The AMXs were under study since December by the Egyptian 
army, which had asked for the possibility of certain modifications. After the Gaza raid however 
the Egyptians declared ready to take the AMXs as they were, if the delivery could take place in 
a one-month period.
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Mystère II aircraft), and naval vessels. 16 The new French government of 
Edgar Faure, continuing the policy line established by Mendès France, 
soon authorized the export of 30 AMXs, 10 Mystères II, and 9 motor 
torpedo boats. These projects were not submitted to the Near East 
Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC) but the British government 
was kept informed by an aide-mémoire. 17 However, no immediate deli-
very of the equipment occurred. As will be shown later, these deliveries 
provoked an internal reaction within the French government. Exports 
in March and April consisted mainly of light armaments, ammunition, 
radio and radar equipment. As far as heavy weapons were concerned, the 
contracts, of a total value of £ 4,128,021, were not signed until late May 
and early June. This was quite a delay given the Egyptian urgency. The 
contracts included the 30 AMX tanks, 33,500 rounds of AMX ammuni-
tion, 54 AMX turrets, 34 155mm howitzers, and 330 Brandt mortar shells 
(contract of April). 18
On the diplomatic level, the French attitude was of a kind that 
suited Egyptian interests. Not only did France adopt a reserved attitude 
upon the announcement of the Turco-Iraqi Treaty, 19 but she also dis-
closed it confidentially to Egypt before the opening of the Cairo Confe-
rence, 20 thus reinforcing this country’s opposition by showing lack of 
solidarity to its American and British allies. 21 The effects of the French 
lack of cooperation were felt by Americans and the British. Washington 
proposed to keep the French informed of defensive arrangements in the 
16 Service historique de la Défense, département armée de Terre [hereafter: SHD-DAT], 
Égypte 10 T 792, 5913/EMA/2/EG, secret, fiche à l’attention du général d’armée, chef d’état-
major de l’armée, objet: livraison de matériel militaire aux forces armées égyptiennes (matériel 
de marine), 18 avril 1955; 2860/SCE, 15 mars 1955; 2890/SCE, 16 mars 1955.
17 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 543, télégramme 479/486 de la s/direction du Levant 
(Massigli) à Amman et à toutes les capitales du Proche-Orient, communiqué à Londres, 
Washington et New York, secret, 2 avril 1955.
18 SHD-DAT, 20 R 152, Section des cessions à l’étranger, bilan des affaires en cours, 29 août 
1955; MAE, Levant  1953-1959, Généralités  545, EMFA, 2e  division, rapports de la France et 
des pays du Moyen-Orient, très secret, 17  avril 1956, annexe  1, tableau chronologique des 
principales fournitures d’armes françaises aux pays du Moyen-Orient.
19 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 537, Présidence du Conseil, le président, note pour 
R. Massigli, 17 janvier 1955.
20 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 537, télégramme 196/97, s/direction du Levant (de 
Margerie) à ambassade de France au Caire, 26 janvier 1955.
21 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités  542, télégramme de l’attaché militaire à Damas, 
7  mars 1955. According to the Syrians, the agreement between Syria and Egypt was owing 
much to French attitude, Anglo-American pression exercised on Syria in favour of its joining 
the Turco-Iraqi treaty, and the Gaza raid.
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Middle East through the American Embassy in Paris, expressing at the 
same time its unhappiness about French disapproval as expressed to Cai-
ro and Damascus. 22 London, for its part, gave assurances on behalf of Iraq 
that Syrian independence would be respected, though this guarantee was 
conditioned by Syrian adherence to the treaty. 23 In any case, polarization 
on behalf of Egypt was not welcome to Paris either, as the agreement of 
2 March between Syria and Egypt confirmed the forging of two opposite 
blocs—and France actually found itself supporting the one that was 
opposed to the organization of defence in the Middle East according to 
Western interests. 24 France therefore adopted a more moderate position 
without, however, exercising a positive action in favour of the Turco-Iraqi 
treaty, in order to preserve its relations with Egypt and Syria. 25 The French 
attitude was, as a result, characterized by a major ambivalence which 
made its British allies talk about a double game. 26
What actually determined Franco-Egyptian relations, however, 
was the perceived role of Egypt in North African issues and its alleged 
assistance to Algerian rebels, in combination with the important division 
that arose within the French government over the question of whether to 
preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel. This division was highly 
relevant to the evolution of the Algerian affair itself and the pressure it 
placed on the fragile and unstable political system of the Fourth Repu-
blic. At the end of 1954, Mendès France had been able to overcome the 
views of the Defence Ministry, which had objected to developing military 
relations between France and Egypt, because he had found no essential 
opposition to his views in the cabinet (Mendès France being prime minis-
ter as well as minister of foreign affairs). Furthermore, the Ministry of the 
Interior, which had the responsibility for Algerian affairs, was following, 
under François Mitterrand, a policy focused on reforms. In this light, the 
22 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 537, le directeur adjoint des Affaires politiques, note 
pour M. le président Edgar Faure, 22 février 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, p. 516, n. 2.
23 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 542, télégramme  430/35, s/direction du Levant à 
ambassade de France à Damas, 5 mars 1955.
24 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 537, télégramme  465/73, Direction générale des 
Affaires politiques, Afrique-Levant (Massigli) à ambassade de France à Damas, priorité 
absolue/réservé, 6 mars 1955.
25 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 542, télégramme 190, Paris (Damas), 15 mars 1955 ; 
610 AL, Clarac au ministre AE, a/s mission Gorse à Damas, 14 avril 1955.
26 PRO, FO 371/115468, 1053/2/55, Cairo to FO, 15 March 1955.
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military repression of the rebellion was a means to an end—and impor-
tant means, but still only a means. 27
Under the Faure government, this changed. The new government 
was based on a precarious balance, whose maintenance required constant 
political gymnastics. 28 The new boss in the Interior was Maurice Bour-
gès-Maunoury and he buried Mitterrand’s experiment of far-reaching 
reforms, these having failed in the face of the opposition of the French 
settlers in Algeria. Military repression of the revolt, instead, now became 
the priority. 29 On the other hand, the North African questions, especially 
Algeria, were taking on a special importance: they were the main issues 
discussed in the French cabinet between March and November 1955. 30
In this context, Egypt was coming to be seen as a principal enemy 
in North Africa, whereas Israel was assuming the aspect of an ally. Ac-
cording to the views of the French military high command, “the Egyptian 
defeat in the 1948 war [...] had healed the wounds of North Africa for 
ten years”. 31 In military documents, the possibility of a policy of military 
action against Egypt as a solution is reported as early as 1955, although 
this view was then rejected as unrealistic—first, on grounds of certain 
international reactions coming from France’s allies and the United Na-
tions, and secondly as being contrary to the French interests in the Arab 
world. 32 The same is recognised for the scenario of a war against Egypt 
through Israel, which, for this reason, made a spectacular Israeli rearma-
ment by French arms sales to this country meaningless. 33
27 For the harmonious cooperation of François Mitterrand and Pierre Mendès France (PMF) 
in the application of a policy that was going to the sense of PMF’s views of modernization, 
see Irwin Wall, “Pierre Mendès France face au problème algérien : une attitude moderne ?”, 
Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, 63-64, July-December 2001, p. 14-15.
28 Georgette Elgey, Histoire de la IVe République, t. 1, La République des tourmentes (1954-1959) 
(Paris, Fayard, 1992), p. 343-4. Edgar Faure formed a government after Antoine Pinay, Pierre 
Pflimlin and Christian Pineau had failed to do so.
29 Martin Thomas, The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French 
Relations, 1945-1962 (London, Macmillan, 2000), p. 80.
30 G. Elgey, La République des tourmentes, op. cit., p. 345.
31 Jacob Tsur, Prélude à Suez. Journal d’une ambassade 1953-1956 (Paris, Presses de la Cité, 
1968), p. 182. The views are expressed by the General Guillaume, general chief of staff of the 
French army.
32 SHD-DAT, Égypte 10 T 792, ventes d’armes à l’Égypte et la propagande radio de La voix 
des Arabes, 17 juin 1955.
33 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 545, EMFA, 2e division, rapports de la France et des 
pays du Moyen-Orient, très secret, 17 avril 1956; SHAT, 9 Q 5 9/3, EMFA, 2e division/section D, 
réunion de la commission interministérielle d’exportation des armements en date du 16 juillet, 
17 juillet 1956.
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As military relations between France and Egypt continued to de-
velop during the spring of 1955, the Defence Ministry saw in it a means to 
stop Egyptian assistance to North African nationalism in all three Fran-
cophone Maghreb countries through press and radio propaganda and by 
supplies of light armaments. 34 A harder line, though, which was to be sup-
ported in the Council of ministers by the defence minister as well, was re-
presented by the Ministry of the Interior which was opposed to arms sales 
to Egypt and favoured, instead, arms sales to Israel. Already in May 1955, 
Louis Mangin and Abel Thomas, close collaborators of Bourgès-Mau-
noury, approached the Israeli Embassy in Paris and asked for contacts 
in order to exchange information, declaring their worry about Egyptian 
rearmament in France. 35 Contacts between Mangin and Thomas, on the 
one hand, and Josef Nachmias, head of the Israeli mission charged with 
arms purchases in Paris, on the other hand, had already been established 
in 1954. Shimon Peres, director of the Israeli Defence Ministry, was the 
principal architect of the Franco-Israeli special relationship between the 
defence ministries of the two countries. 36 In May the Israelis asked France 
to sell them more heavy weapons and Mystère II aircraft. However, the 
Quai d’Orsay resisted, on the grounds that previous contracts already 
concluded with Israel were sufficient to keep a balance of forces between 
it and the Arab countries. 37
It was with this background that the contracts concerning heavy ar-
maments—though not the Mystère II aircraft 38—were signed with Egypt 
between the end of May and the beginning of June. This came about 
despite an intense radio propaganda against the recent Franco-Tunisian 
34 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 537, le conseiller diplomatique, note à l’attention 
du général Kœnig sur ce qui pourrait être l’attitude française devant le pacte turco-irakien, 
14  mars  1955; SHAT, Égypte  10  T  92, 5913/EMA/2/EG, secret, fiche à l’attention du général 
d’armée, chef d’état-major de l’armée, objet : livraison de matériel militaire aux forces armées 
égyptiennes (matériel de marine), 18 avril 1955.
35 J. Tsur, Prélude à Suez, op. cit., p. 210.
36 Sylvia K. Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War (Princeton, 
N.J., Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 57.
37 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 722, s/direction du Levant, note pour le président, a/s 
livraisons d’armes aux États du Proche-Orient, 16 mai 1955. For Tsur’s démarches, see J. Tsur, 
Prélude à Suez, op. cit., p. 209.
38 The affair disappears from the diplomatic documents after the export authorization given 
in April 1955. According to the first secretary of the French Embassy in Cairo, such a delivery 
took place, see Bernard Destremau, Quai d’Orsay. Derrière la façade (Paris, Plon, 1994), p. 158. 
However, no delivery of any Mystère  II aircraft at all is reported in French archives for the 
ME countries in 1955. The very first delivery of jet aircraft to a ME country concerned the 
Mystère IV aircraft sent to Israel in April 1956.
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treaties and unaffected by the declaration made by Nasser in favour of 
Algerian independence at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. 39 On 
the other hand, at the end of April Egypt had suspended the use of its 
army camps for training North African commandos. 40 By mid-June, 
however, the continued propaganda of the Egyptian radio was cited as 
the main reason to interrupt arms deliveries towards Egypt. Various di-
plomatic démarches of protest by the French Embassy in Cairo had been 
fruitless and Nasser gave no answer to requests for a meeting. 41 This time, 
the French Council of ministers decided to interrupt arms supplies to 
Arab countries, approving at the same time arms supplies for Israel. 42 The 
decision was accepted by the Comité de la Défense nationale. This was 
despite objections raised by the French military attaché in Cairo, for the 
sake of preserving military influence in the country and so as better serve 
French interests in North Africa better by insisting on the method of di-
plomatic démarches. 43 On 20 June 1955 General Pierre Kœnig, the French 
defence minister, announced to Colonel Saroite Okacha, the Egyptian 
military attaché in Paris, that the delivery of four 155mm howitzers, due 
to take place that day, was suspended. The next day, the French military 
attaché in Cairo sought an audience between the French ambassador and 
Nasser. A day later, it seems that Nasser agreed to send a telegram to the 
Tunisian nationalist leader, Habib Bourguiba, expressing his approval of 
the Franco-Tunisian agreements. 44 Normally, as requested by the ministry 
of Foreign Affairs as well as the military attaché in Cairo, the deliveries to 
Egypt should go on as scheduled. This, however, was not what occurred.
39 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, télégramme 1323/26, s/direction du Levant (Massigli) 
à ambassade de France au Caire, 2  juin 1955; télégramme  1092, s/direction du Levant à 
ambassade de France au Caire, 26 avril 1955.
40 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 485, télégramme 559/60, Le Caire, 20 mai 1955.
41 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, télégramme 1323/26, s/direction du Levant (Massigli) 
à ambassade de France au Caire, 2 juin 1955.
42 J. Tsur, Prélude à Suez, op. cit., p. 226.
43 SHD-DAT, Égypte 10 T 792, ventes d’armes à l’Égypte et la propagande radio de La voix 
des Arabes, 17 juin 1955.
44 SHD-DAT, Égypte 10 T 792, 7255/EMFA, Secrétariat d’État aux Forces armées (Guerre), 
EM, 2e bureau, 8  juillet 1955  : Copie du télégramme 72-73 du 23  juin 1955 a/s de la récente 
crise franco-égyptienne relative à la vente d’armes par la France à l’Égypte. Origine : Attaché 
militaire Le  Caire. For the telegram of Nasser to Bourguiba, see MAE, Levant  1953-1959, 
Généralités 545, EMFA, 2e division, rapports de la France et des pays du Moyen-Orient, très 
secret, 17  avril 1956, annexe  1, tableau chronologique des principales fournitures d’armes 
françaises aux pays du Moyen-Orient.
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At stake, in reality, was the very same execution of deliveries to 
Egypt and, by that, the general question of Egypt’s rearmament by France. 
The total of the Egyptian orders were ready to be shipped by June, when 
the interruption occurred. 45 That was the case also at the end of the sum-
mer. Then, following intervention by the Minister of the Interior Bour-
gès-Maunoury, a shipment of the AMX tanks was blocked in the port of 
Marseille and the French cabinet decided on a new interruption of delive-
ries to Egypt, notified on 5 September. In the cabinet, Bourgès-Maunoury 
and Kœnig made arms deliveries to Egypt conditional on arms deliveries 
to Israel, and this was approved by the Prime Minister Faure. 46 In this case 
too, the interruption had been preceded by effective opposition from the 
ministry of Foreign Affairs about the contracts to be signed with Israel. 
The cabinet had accepted the view that a comprehensive transaction 
was not to take place and that, instead, each category of arms was to be 
treated separately. 47 What the Quai d’Orsay was essentially after was to 
avoid the cession of Mystère jet aircraft to Israel. However, the pressure 
exercised in the Council of ministers was now making the Quai consider 
the option of a general embargo on arms sales towards the Middle East 
countries, as an alibi towards Egypt at a moment that arms deliveries 
were met by “certain difficulties”, and as a means of stopping arms de-
liveries towards Israel “which had been, since some time, dangerously 
accelerated”. 48
In fact, the line followed by Bourgès-Maunoury and his success 
to block the fulfilment of the Egyptian contracts needs to be interpreted 
as a success of Israeli policy. Since 1953, Tel Aviv’s aim was not only to 
acquire arms for Israel in the West but also to block arms deliveries to 
Arab countries. 49 Such efforts were unsuccessful in Britain and the USA, 
but apparently bore fruit in France, thanks to the complicity of a part of 
the Council of ministers, even before the war in Algeria had grown more 
violent with the massacre of Europeans in Philippeville in August 1955. It 
is of particular importance, furthermore, that it was common knowledge 
45 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 543, 1432, le ministre AE au ministre de la Défense 
nationale et des Forces armées [hereafter: DNFA], a/s état de livraison d’armes aux pays du 
Proche-Orient (mai-juin 1955), secret, 18 août 1955.
46 S. K. Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance, op. cit., p. 57.
47 J. Tsur, Prélude à Suez, op. cit., p. 217, 231 and 236-7.
48 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 722, s/direction du Levant, note pour le directeur 
général des Affaires politiques, 12 septembre 1955.
49 David Tal, “The American-Israeli Security Treaty: Sequel or Means to the Relief of Israeli-
Arab Tensions, 1954-55”, Middle Eastern Studies, 31/4, October 1995, p. 832.
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in France that selling certain types of heavy weaponry to Israel was giving 
that country an overwhelming superiority over the Arab countries. 50
On 27 September the Czech-Egyptian arms agreement became 
known. Yet Nasser still seemed interested in pursuing Egypt’s military 
relations with France. He thus gave instructions in the end of October 
to moderate Radio Cairo’s propaganda. He also offered assurances that 
no training of commandos had been or would be undertaken in Egyptian 
camps. Nasser expressed his hope that the French government would 
continue its arms deliveries to Egypt. This was in fact the case, by a de-
cision of 9 November, on condition that no arms would be sent to North 
Africa from Egypt, no opposition would be made to North African perso-
nalities who wanted to come to terms with France, and also a favourable 
examination of French offers on adjudications opened in Egypt. 51 At the 
same time, France accorded certain economic facilities to Egypt. 52
According to French views, Nasser probably wanted to be prudent 
to a certain extent in his liaison with the Soviet camp, 53 and also retain a 
role of interlocutor for North African affairs. 54 Actually, by dint of attri-
buting responsibilities to Nasser and placing extreme importance upon 
Egyptian propaganda in North African affairs, the French were already re-
cognizing that the Egyptian leader had an important role. However, Nas-
ser also had other reasons for wanting to keep on good terms with France, 
whose general policy in the Middle East, in particular over the Baghdad 
Pact, accorded with his own interests. Nasser was far from indifferent to 
the scope for playing off antagonisms between the Western powers. He 
insisted that France should sell arms to Saudi Arabia, which was actually 
contrary to what the British wanted, and he nourished French hopes of 
50 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 543, SOFMA, note sur la vente de chars à l’Égypte, 
la Syrie et Israël, 10 mars 1955. This concerned in particular the sale of the AMX tank and its 
barrel (75 Vo 1,000). Once adapted to the old tanks already in possession of the Israeli army, 
such as the Shermans and the M10s, this barrel was allowing Israel to have an overwhelming 
superiority of fire.
51 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, interventions françaises auprès du gouvernement 
égyptien en 1955 et 1956.
52 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, 1535  AL, Armand du Chayla à Antoine Pinay, a/s 
entretien avec le colonel Nasser, 19 novembre 1955 ; télégramme 27, s/direction du Levant, le 
ministre AE à l’ambassadeur de France au Caire (signé René Massigli), a/s attitude de l’Égypte 
à l’égard de la France, 7 janvier 1956.
53 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 545, EMFA, 2e division, rapports de la France et des 
pays du Moyen-Orient, très secret, 17 avril 1956.
54 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 542, 1285 AL, du Chayla à Pinay, 12 octobre 1955.
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participating in the works of the Aswan Dam. Last but not least, Nasser 
was worried about the escalation of French arms sales towards Israel. 55
What was confirmed in the aftermath of the Czech-Egyptian arms 
deal, however, was the duality of French policy that was resulting from 
internal division on Middle Eastern matters. The deal came at a moment 
when war in Algeria was escalating after the Philippeville massacres. 56 
Henceforth the war in Algeria was taken more seriously. A two-pronged 
strategy was implemented to confine the Algerian front by military 
repression in the interior and by depriving the Algerian rebels of their 
external aid. This not only signified the importance of Israel as an ally 
(close collaboration with the Israeli secret services being valuable for the 
French in order to control arms traffic towards the Algerians), 57 where 
Egypt participated as well. 58 After the Czech-Egyptian arms deal—and 
one has to keep in mind that two days later Egypt and the USSR were 
among the countries asking for the tabling of the Algerian affair on the 
UN agenda 59—Faure promised the Israelis satisfaction of their requests 
for weapons. 60 On 10 November, a general protocol was signed by the 
French Defence Ministry, concerning heavy armament, without prior 
knowledge of the Quai d’Orsay. 61 On the other hand, deliveries of the 
contracts already concluded with Israel accelerated until the end of the 
55 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, 1535  AL, du Chayla à Pinay, a/s entretien avec 
le colonel Nasser, 19  novembre 1955  ; télégramme  27, s/direction du Levant, le ministre  AE 
à l’ambassadeur de France au Caire (signé Massigli), a/s attitude de l’Égypte à l’égard de la 
France, 7 janvier 1956.
56 Alistair Horne, Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris, Albin Michel, 1980), p. 127-8.
57 Douglas Porch, Histoire des services secrets français, t. 2, De la guerre d’Indochine au Rainbow 
Warrior (Paris, Albin Michel, 1997), p. 126-7.
58 See, for exemple, FNSP-CHEVS, Fonds Alain Savary, SV 43, télégramme 1156/66, Affaires 
marocaines et tunisiennes à Haut-Commissaire Tunis, 1er  juin 1956  : communication du 
télégramme  50192 daté du même jour, Repan Paris (Alexandre Parodi) à Diplomatie Paris. 
And see also: Fathi Al Dib, Abdel Nasser et la révolution algérienne (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1985).
59 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 65-9; 
Le Monde, 2-3 October 1955.
60 J. Tsur, Prélude à Suez, op. cit., p. 259-60.
61 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 543, s/direction du Levant, note pour le ministre a/s 
problèmes relatifs aux exportations d’armes vers le Proche-Orient, annexe  I, 20 mars 1956. 
France was engaged to deliver in the beginning of 1956, instead of the period between April 
and June 1956, 30 AMX tanks, which were indeed sent on 3 February to Israel. The contracts 
signed in accordance with this protocol concerned 850 SS 10 engines (over a total of 1,000, 
which actually left place for the signature of a new contract concerning the 250 left out), 
500  rocket-launchers, 1,000  rockets. The contracts not yet signed concerned 60  AMXs, 
40 Shermans, 8,000 strikes of 75 and 8,000 shell ammunitions.
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year, though Ouragans instead of Mystères IV were delivered. 62 The Quai 
managed to block the signature of a part of the contracts, these on Mys-
tères IV included, by presenting the argument that this model could not 
be ceded to Israel because of American opposition, as this aircraft was 
the object of off-shore contracts. 63 The Israeli Kinneret (Lake Tiberias) 
Operation in early December assisted the Quai’s position because of the 
general embargo imposed on Israel.
During 1956, the two sides remained stuck to their respective 
positions: the defence officials, at the head of whom now stood Bour-
gès-Maunoury, the new minister under the Mollet government, would 
do their best to block deliveries towards Egypt. In February ten AMX 
tanks were the first and also the last to be delivered to Egypt, and at 
the beginning of April it was decided to conclude no further contracts 
with Nasser. 64 At the same time, the ministry of Defence was pressing 
for the conclusion of contracts with Israel and finally circumvented the 
obstacle of the Quai d’Orsay in June by a clandestine agreement reached 
in Vermars between the Franco-Israeli secret services. The agreement 
provided extended sales of heavy weapons and Mystère IV aircraft to 
Israel in exchange for cooperation in intelligence and in combined ope-
rations. 65 The agreement was known to the Prime Minister Guy Mollet 
and to the Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, although not to the rest 
of the government. 66 The Quai d’Orsay, on the other hand, continued 
to delay the signature of contracts with Israel, first by evoking American 
opposition concerning the Mystère IV aircraft. When this was no longer 
62 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 727, 10753, ministère DNFA, section des cessions 
à l’étranger, au ministère  AE, direction générale des Affaires politiques, exemplaire  1/5, 
état des livraisons d’armes aux pays du Moyen-Orient au cours des mois de septembre et 
octobre 1955, secret, 12 novembre 1955; 345, ministère DNFA, section des cessions à l’étranger 
au ministère  AE, direction générale des Affaires politiques/Afrique-Levant, exemplaire  1/5, 
état des livraisons d’armes aux pays du Moyen-Orient au cours des mois de novembre 
et décembre  1955, secret, 13  janvier 1956; 412, le ministre  AE à l’ambassadeur de France à 
Washington, a/s état périodique de nos livraisons de matériel de guerre au Proche-Orient, 
21  janvier 1956. These releases concerned 12 Ouragans, 12 Ouragans MD 450, 6  jet engines 
for Ouragan, 18 AMX tanks, 2 Nord 2501 airplanes, rocket-launchers, shells, parachutes, SS 10 
engines and other types of armaments.
63 J. Tsur, Prélude à Suez, op. cit., p. 270-4.
64 SHD-DAT, 9 Q 5 9/3, ministère DFNA, 939  DN/CAB/ARM/SC, décision du ministre, 
objet : cession de matériels de guerre aux pays du Proche-Orient, 6 avril 1956.
65 Motti Golani, La guerre du Sinaï 1955-1956 (Monaco, Éditions du Rocher, 2000), p. 49-52 
and 55.
66 J. Tsur, Prélude à Suez, op. cit., p. 376-8.
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possible, after the shift in the American position, 67 the Quai searched 
keenly for some arrangement with the British and the Americans in order 
to share the burden of the Israeli armament. This effort failed because 
neither Washington nor London had any such intention. 68 When this 
option was excluded, the Quai regularly used the absence of an answer 
from the NEACC as a stalling tactic. 69
At the beginning of July 1956—probably after having learned about 
the secret Vermars agreement of the previous month—the Quai openly 
asked the Americans and British, via the French embassy in Washington, 
for aid through some form of declaration. This, Quai officials hoped, 
could be used by Paris so as to downscale the Israeli orders. According to 
the message, “the government was under strong pressure of pro-Israeli 
elements” and actually help was asked “for the minority of the cabinet”, 
which was apparently the ministry of Foreign Affairs. 70 Indeed, since the 
Quai had begun to lose control of French arms sales to Israel, turning 
towards allied solidarity appeared the means to contain this evolution 
and to avoid France being presented as the main supplier of the Hebrew 
state. Otherwise, the alternative of a general embargo on arms sales 
towards Middle East states appeared once again. 71
This absolute polarization that came about during 1956 was clo-
sely related to the rapid escalation of the war in Algeria during that year, 
and was not without its contradictions. At the beginning of 1956, infor-
mation about Egyptian interference in arms traffic towards Algeria and 
67 Informally the Americans had no objections since the end of January 1956, after the end of 
the embargo on Israel, and definitely since their definitive refusal to sell arms to Israel, in the end 
of March. They were then clearly in favour of French and Canadian cessions of Mystères IV and 
Sabres F 86: see télégramme 329/52, Couve de Murville (Washington) à Pinay, 21 janvier 1956, 
in Documents diplomatiques français [hereafter: DDF], 1956, t.  I (Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 
1988), p. 61-2; and télégramme 2366/74, Couve de Murville (Washington) à Pineau, 12 avril 
1956, ibid., p. 571-3.
68 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 543, s/direction du Levant, note pour le président, 
a/s livraisons d’armes aux pays du Proche-Orient, 4 juin 1956 ; note de la direction d’Afrique-
Levant, a/s fournitures d’armes à Israël, 13  juin 1956, in DDF, 1956, t.  I, p.  985-6; PRO, 
FO 371/121348, V1192/761, minute by E. M. Rose, arms for Israel, secret, July 9, 1956.
69 SHD-DAT, 9 Q 5 9/3, EMFA, 2e division/section D, réunion de la commission interministé-
rielle d’exportation des armements en date du 16 juillet, 17 juillet 1956.
70 Levey, op. cit., p. 71. See also Jean-Yves Bernard, La genèse de l’expédition franco-britannique 
de 1956 en Égypte (Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003), p. 279: for the personal demand 
of the French ambassador to London, Jean Chauvel, to Selwyn Lloyd. Chauvel asked Lloyd, in 
July, to advise Pineau against the dangers of a policy of a strong support towards Israel.
71 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Généralités 543, s/direction du Levant, note pour le président, a/s 
livraisons d’armes aux pays du Proche-Orient, 4 juin 1956.
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commando training was divulged to the press. 72 The alleged role of Egypt 
and Nasser progressively assumed serious dimensions in public discourse 
and pressure on the government increased, not so much because of the 
public but more from parliamentary opinion applied by the ultras of 
French Algeria. This further damaged Franco-Egyptian relations. From 
the very start, Mollet’s new coalition government formed at the start of 
February 1956 found itself under strong pressures, after the Premier’s vi-
sit in Algiers had turned to disaster because of French settlers’ reaction. 73 
Despite previous liberal declarations on the Algerian question, Mollet’s 
declared priority became military suppression and by summer French 
military forces in Algeria had been doubled. 74
Behind the scenes, however, Mollet sought to reach terms with 
Algerian rebels and negotiate on the basis of autonomy. Because of this 
objective, the Quai d’Orsay in March arranged a meeting between the 
new foreign minister, Pineau, and Nasser in Cairo. 75 Relations with Egypt, 
despite public tension, were in fact quite satisfactory and those French 
who wanted to negotiate with the Algerians counted on an Egyptian mo-
derating influence. All the same, they knew that Egyptian help could only 
be gained by maintaining a relative calm in French-Egyptian relations. 76 
Nasser provided assurances that he had no aggressive intentions against 
Israel and that no more North African nationalists were to be trained in 
Egyptian camps. 77 Pineau, for his part, assured Nasser that France had no 
intention of delivering more Mystère IV aircraft to Israel. 78
Soon after, in April, negotiations between French emissaries and 
Algerian nationalists took place in Cairo. These, however, leaked to the 
72 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 485, 79, le ministre AE au ministre de l’Intérieur, secret/
très urgent, 7 janvier 1956; s/direction du Levant, secret/urgent, le ministre AE (signé Christian 
Pineau) au Secrétaire d’État chargé des affaires algériennes, 1er mars 1956.
73 Le journal d’Alger, 7 February 1956; A. Horne, Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie, op. cit., p. 152-6.
74 Jean Doise, Maurice Vaïsse, Diplomatie et outil militaire 1871-1991 (Paris, Seuil, Points 
Histoire, 1992), p. 570-1.
75 MAE, PAAP, René Massigli 95, lettre de Massigli à Jean Chauvel, 7 mars 1956; Levant 1953-
1959, Généralités  543, Secrétariat général (Massigli) de la part du président du Conseil à 
Karachi (Pineau), télégramme 81/83, réservé, 8 mars 1956.
76 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 485, note without date (probably of the end of 
February 1956).
77 MAE, Secrétariat général, entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, vol. 1, télégrammes 2727/29 
et 2857/59, direction Afrique-Levant (signés Massigli) à ambassades de France à Londres et à 
Washington, 20 mars 1956.
78 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 484, 832 AL, A. du Chayla à C. Pineau, a/s entretien avec 
le directeur du cabinet du président du Conseil, 23 mai 1956.
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Egyptian press in May. 79 At that moment a new tension between France 
and Egypt had occurred. The cause was not only new French cessions of 
Mystères IV to Israel and escalation of military operations in Algeria but 
also—and mostly—because of a more “quiet” French policy towards the 
Baghdad Pact, adopted by Paris in exchange for public British support of 
the French government’s policy on Algeria. 80
Publicity, however, was the last thing the French government nee-
ded. Further negotiations with the FLN were conducted later in Italy and 
Yugoslavia and no other contacts seem to have been taken through the 
Egyptians. Pineau’s journey was much criticized in the French Parliament 
and the beginning of the summer saw the zenith of Nasser’s demoniza-
tion in the public speech of the ultras of French Algeria (Bourgès-Mau-
noury, Jacques Soustelle, Robert Lacoste). 81 The nationalization of the 
Suez Company in July was certainly not to help the image of the Egyptian 
leader in the eyes of French public opinion. 82
By the time Nasser announced the canal nationalization and Soviet 
financing for the Aswan Dam project at the end of July, polarization in 
France was a fact. The minority, preaching for a moderate attitude towards 
Egypt, mainly the Quai d’Orsay, had no hope of making its views prevail. 
French foreign policy in the Middle East was slipping out of its control. Fran-
co-Egyptian relations also suffered from the double game played by Nasser 
who was indeed offering his aid to Algerian rebels, especially after Morocco 
and Tunisia had gained independence and the orientation of the regimes of 
these states were leaving those Algerian rebels attached to Cairo the only 
sphere of Nasserist influence in French North Africa. However, Nasser was 
far from controlling the extremely divided Algerian nationalist movement. 83 
79 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte 485, 999  AL, A.  du Chayla à C.  Pineau, 15  juin 1956; 
1000 AL, A. du Chayla à C. Pineau, 15 juin 1956.
80 S. Papastamkou, La France au Proche-Orient, 1950-1958 : un intrus ou une puissance exclue ?, 
thèse de doctorat dirigée par Robert Frank, université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2007, p. 551-
6. The British were in fact very worried about the possibility that the French come to terms 
with Nasser, as this meant that they would continue their public disapproval of the Baghdad 
Pact, whereas Guy Mollet had promised Eden the contrary in March 1956, see ibid., p. 382-91.
81 MAE, Levant 1953-1959, Égypte, 485, télégramme 207/8, cabinet du Secrétaire d’État à 
ambassade de France à New Delhi, 10 mars 1956; J.-Y. Bernard, La genèse de l’expédition franco-
britannique…, op. cit., p. 325-6; Guy Pervillé, Pour une histoire de la guerre d’Algérie, 1954-1962 
(Paris, Picard, 2002), p. 130.
82 Le monde, 29-30  July 1956 (article of Maurice Schumann); Le monde, 4  August 1956; 
PRO, PREM 11/1352, discours prononcé par G. Mollet, président du Conseil, à l’occasion de 
l’inauguration du monument d’Émile Basly, Lens, 23 septembre 1956.
83 A. Horne, Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie, op. cit., p. 149-51.
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His aid towards the Algerians indeed increased immediately after the natio-
nalization of the Suez Company, 84 a move probably aimed at keeping French 
forces busy in Algeria. Nasser feared a war against him in the immediate 
aftermath of the nationalization initiated by Great Britain and, if that were 
the case, also by France. 85 Nasser’s aid, however, was largely exaggerated in 
France by activists in the French government.
In the summer of 1956, Franco-Egyptian relations clearly entered 
a war of logic. The Franco-Israeli secret alliance, agreed upon in June 
sealed the cooperation between the two sides on intelligence matters 
and provided arms for Israel in exchange for cooperation in operations 
against Egyptian targets as well. Nasser’s radicalization through the na-
tionalization of the Suez Company provided a tangible reason for war 
probably tolerated by the international community, especially as it was 
giving British support to the French.
In the autumn, the Suez operation can clearly be interpreted as the 
second prong of a strategy to isolate the Algerian front. The kidnapping of 
the Algerian leader Ben Bella was destined to decapitate the nationalist 
movement in the interior, while the operation against Egypt was to cut off 
external aid to the nationalists, soon after the capture of the vessel Athos 
provided tangible evidence of Egyptian interference in arms traffic. 86 
However, by its radio propaganda, by the arms traffic, by the training of 
some two hundred nationalists in Egyptian camps out of twenty thousand 
rebels in Algeria, 87 by its diplomatic aid in the UN, Egypt certainly had a 
role in Algeria. Yet it was far from large enough that it could justify a war. 
By chasing nationalist phantoms in Egypt, French hard-liners chose to put 
aside what other Frenchmen saw clearly, as one of them reported from 
Algiers: “The Egyptian propaganda did a lot for the realisation of national 
awareness [in Algeria] but those mainly responsible are the French and 
their policy of repression.” 88
84 F. Al Dib, Abdel Nasser et la révolution algérienne, op. cit., p. 166-7 and 169; MAE, cabinet du 
ministre, Christian Pineau 1956-1958, 19, note sur les ingérences égyptiennes en Afrique du 
Nord, 20 octobre 1956.
85 Muhammad H. Haykal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes (New York, Arbor 
House, 1987), p. 122.
86 Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States and the Algerian War (Berkeley/London, University 
of California Press, 2001), p. 50-1.
87 MAE, cabinet du ministre, Christian Pineau  1956-1958, 19, note sur les ingérences 
égyptiennes en Afrique du Nord, 20 octobre 1956; note a/s de la situation en Algérie, 19 octobre 
1956.
88 FNSP-CHEVS, Fonds Alain Savary, SV 56, lettre de R. Perié à A. Savary, Alger, 30 avril 1956.
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